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A Peek Over the Great Firewall: A Breakdown
of China’s New Cybersecurity Law
Jacob Quinn*
I. INTRODUCTION
While most are familiar with the “Great Firewall of China,” the Chinese
government’s Internet censorship against foreign websites and unfavorable
speech,1 people are less familiar with what part this firewall plays in the
intricacies of China’s cybersecurity regime. President Xi Jinping emphasized
on multiple occasions that the Internet poses new challenges for China’s in-
terests and that the government is rightly empowered to dictate the measures
securing those interests.2 On November 7, 2016, the government promul-
gated a new set of cybersecurity measures against the protest of numerous
foreign businesses.3 These measures are aimed primarily at network provid-
ers who provide services the government determines crucial to the operation
of services on the Internet, also known as “critical information infrastruc-
ture.”4 The law will require the providers to submit to an invasive security
review and store any data collected from the users in China within the geo-
graphic boundaries of China.5 This policy enables China’s regulatory agen-
cies to exercise wide discretion in determining which providers fall into what
category, and what precise measures need to be taken to satisfy the legisla-
tion.6 While China is not alone in creating such a state-controlled cyber-
security regime, the broad authority it gives to itself is notable, leaving little
for non-government entities to do but obey.7
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. History, cum laude,
2015, University of North Texas.
1. Gary Brown & Christopher D. Yung, Evaluating the US-China Cybersecurity
Agreement, Part 2: China’s Take on Cyberspace and Cybersecurity, DIPLOMAT
(Jan. 1, 2017), http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/evaluating-the-us-china-cyber-
security-agreement-part-2-chinas-take-on-cyberspace-and-cybersecurity/.
2. Chris Mirasola, Understanding China’s Cybersecurity Law, LAWFARE (Nov. 8,





6. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa
( ) (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), art. 31, translated in 2016
Cybersecurity Law, CHINA LAW TRANSLATE (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.china
lawtranslate.com/cybersecuritylaw/?lang=en, art. 31 (unofficial translation)
[hereinafter Cybersecurity Law].
7. Brown & Yung, supra note 1.
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This comment discusses the foreseeable consequences of such a broad,
state-controlled regime and compares such cybersecurity control to other
countries’ cyberspace policies. Part II lays out the general dangers in cyber-
space that have given rise to systemized cybersecurity, along with the con-
cepts in cybersecurity regimes. Part III compares China’s previous efforts to
establish its own cybersecurity regime to the recently passed 2016 Cyber-
security Law. Part IV compares China’s presently promulgated cybersecurity
regimes with those established by other prominent countries. Finally, Part V
analyzes the foreseeable impact of the 2016 Cybersecurity Law, including
the potential harm the law could inflict on the Chinese public, the cooling
effect it could have on foreign business in China, and the consequences it
could have against globalization.
II. THE LANDSCAPE OF CYBERSPACE
As the Internet becomes more of an instrumental part of our daily lives,
the level of harm it could do to our society should it be misused increases.8
Countries around the world have experienced the problems that come with
wiring essential aspects of life and governance to the world wide web, expos-
ing crucial systems to attack from half way around the world.9 While the
days of physical bombings and theft are not yet behind us, it is becoming
clear that enemies of the state can wreak more havoc from cyberspace than
they can with attacks in the real world.10
A. The Perils of the Digital Age
Threats from cyberspace come in numerous forms, but can be loosely
categorized by the target of the threat and what kind of harm is intended by
the attack. When an individual (a private citizen with limited connection to a
business or government)11 is targeted, the intended harm is usually theft of
finances.12 The attacker, through either an active attempt to fool the individ-
ual into giving up their personal information (e.g., bank account information,
8. See generally Nilesh Christopher, The Worst Cyberattacks of 2016, ECONOMIC
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016, 8:59 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-
biz/security-tech/security/the-worst-cyber-attacks-of-2016/articleshow/562124
48.cms (discussing the effect of cyberattacks causing financial information and
voter data leaks, mass Internet outage, and interference in the U.S. election).
9. See generally id. (referring to cyberattacks in India, Bangladesh, Philippines,
and the United States).
10. See Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberattacks
Through Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 1273, 1296–302 (2013)
(outlining categories of “cyberthreats”).
11. What Is Individual?, LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/individual/
(last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
12. See Internet Users Lose Rs 32,400 on an Average to Cyber Attacks, ECONOMIC
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017, 5:30 PM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/maga
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social security number, or passwords to financially sensitive accounts), or
passively infecting his computer with a virus or worm, solicits enough infor-
mation to commit identity theft.13 Once the attacker is able to convince a
system that he is the targeted individual, he can do anything from opening
new lines of credit in the person’s name, to using the person’s computer as a
part of a network of infected computers to attack more complex systems in a
manner described below.14 The intended harm could also be more explicitly
malicious if the attack has a specific desire to harm the targeted individual.15
Using the same methods as the attacker above, the malicious actor can ex-
pose information on the person’s computer to the public, bringing all sorts of
humiliating details to light.16
When targeting a business, the intended harm will usually be some sort
of theft.17 This theft can range from intellectual property,18 to consumer in-
formation,19 and private communications.20 Such information can be used for
the attacker’s explicit benefits, or simply to harm the target.21 Examples of
such attacks include a theft of trade secrets from ThyssenKrupp,22 theft of
zines/panache/Internet-users-lose-rs-32400-on-an-average-to-cyber-attacks/ar-
ticleshow/56832600.cms.
13. Aashika Jaan, How Safe Are You From Cyber Attacks?, ECONOMIC TIMES (Jun.





17. See Neha Alawadhi, Cyber Attacks Cost Companies 20 Per Cent Revenues in
2016, ECONOMIC TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017, 11:58 AM), http://economictimes.india
times.com/industry/tech/Internet/cyber-attacks-cost-companies-20-per-cent-rev
enues-in-2016/articleshow/57014638.cms.
18. Eric Auchard & Tom Ka¨ckenhoff, ThyssenKrupp Trade Secrets Stolen in
‘Massive’ Cyber Attack This Year, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2016, 3:45 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-thyssenkrupp-cyber/thyssenkrupp-secrets-stolen-
in-massive-cyber-attack-idUSKBN13X0VW.
19. See Pratik Bhakta, E-Wallet Companies Grow Fast, but Not Covered for Cyber
Attack, ECONOMIC TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017 10:14 AM), http://economictimes.india
times.com/markets/stocks/news/e-wallet-companies-grow-fast-but-not-cov
ered-for-cyber-attack/articleshow/56305712.cms.
20. Julia Boorstin, The Sony Hack: One Year Later, CNBC (Nov. 25, 2015, 4:42
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/24/the-sony-hack-one-year-later.html.
21. Id.
22. See Auchard & Ka¨ckenhoff, supra note 18.
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account holders’ information from financial institutions,23 and the infamous
hack on Sony.24
In some instances, if the business is providing a service, disruption of
that service may also be the intended harm, for various reasons.25 These dis-
ruptions are usually the result of overloading the server that handles routing
information to various websites with requests (using computers that have
been infected by malicious software) to the point where it freezes up.26 A
recent example of this kind of cyberattack on businesses was a paralyzing of
Dyn servers, which led to the temporary shutdown of popular websites like
Facebook and Twitter.27
When targeting a government, or an agent of the state, the intended
harm will usually be theft of information,28 dissemination of false informa-
tion,29 or a disruption of services.30 The attacker could be anyone from a
private individual with a grievance against the state,31 an organized group
trying to accomplish an agenda,32 or another government.33 The most obvious
example of this is the National Security Agency’s surveillance scheme,
which exploited flaws in cybersecurity systems and data protection to moni-
tor both foreign and domestic activities.34 Utility services have also been sub-
ject to cyber attacks, potentially denying electricity to large segments of the
23. See Bhakta, supra note 19.
24. See Boorstin, supra note 20.
25. Nicky Woolf, DDoS Attack That Disrupted Internet Was Largest of Its Kind,




28. Matthew Funk, Tragedy of the Commons: Snowden’s Reformation and the Bal-
kanization of the Internet, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 39, 49 (2015)
(discussing both the NSA scandal and the impact it had on the cybersecurity
policies of several countries).
29. Melissa Eddy, After a Cyberattack, Germany Fears Election Disruption, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/world/europe/ger-
many-russia-hacking.html (discussing cyberattack on German Parliament’s
computer network and evidence of attempts to influence the federal election).
30. Pavel Polityuk et al., Ukraine’s Power Outage Was a Cyber Attack:
Ukrenergo, REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2017, 6:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-ukraine-cyber-attack-energy-idUSKBN1521BA.
31. See Funk, supra note 28, at 49.
32. See Christopher, supra note 8.
33. See Eddy, supra note 29.
34. Funk, supra note 28, at 49–52.
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population.35 If such an attack was carried out by a foreign attacker, espe-
cially if combined with military action, the effect would be devastating.
The greatest risks a government faces are disruptions of its critical infra-
structure (CI). CI is generally defined as areas that, should they suffer an
attack, could cause a destabilizing effect on the country.36 But, this definition
is not universal, and what one country legally defines as falling under its CI
may be something another country leaves as general infrastructure.37 For ex-
ample, the attack on Dyn, a private business, could be an attack on CI if the
U.S. government considered that the connections to the various websites that
Dyn supported would have a destabilizing effect if severed.38 Other areas that
are universally considered CI are public utilities (power and water manage-
ment) and systems of transportation.39
With these threats arrayed against a nation and its citizens, it is recog-
nized that the state should take steps to ensure its citizens, its private sector,
and itself are secure from harm.40 But, what steps should a state take? Should
it interfere with private businesses (i.e., businesses not owned by the state) to
ensure that the information they collect from citizens is secured? Should it
prevent access to parts of the Internet, to keep citizens from straying into
areas where their data can’t be protected? In addressing questions like these,
certain schools of thought have developed to guide the creation of many
countries’ cybersecurity regimes.41
35. See Polityuk et al., supra note 30.
36. See Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 § 2 (Feb. 12, 2013).
37. See Symposium, Beyond The New “Digital Divide”: Analyzing The Evolving
Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cyber-
security, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119, 144 (2014) [hereinafter Digital Divide].
38. See Woolf, supra note 25; see generally Eugenia Georgiades et al., Crisis on
Impact: Responding to Cyber Attacks on Critical Information Infrastructures,
30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 31 (2013) (discussing various
aspects of cyberattacks on industries generally considered to be CI and how the
affected governments responded).
39. See Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 149 (citing William J. Lynn III, Deputy
Sec’y of Def., Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, (July
14, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593); see
also id. at 153 (citing Commission Proposal for a Council Decision on a Criti-
cal Infrastructure Warning Information Network, at 10, COM (2008) 676 final
(Oct. 27, 2008)).
40. Id. at 122.
41. Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a State-Centric Cyber Peace?:
Analyzing The Role of National Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing Global
Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 895, 898–99 (2015).
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B. Guiding Concepts in Cybersecurity
There are two schools of thought that have arisen to help conceptualize
how countries protect themselves and their citizens online.42 These schools of
thought can be seen as opposing ends of a spectrum, while presenting a false
choice and denying the existence of a middle road.43 Both schools of thought
could also be seen as pipe dreams that rely on analogizing the Internet as
something that it is not.44 But, while these philosophies appear unhelpful in
actually developing a workable cybersecurity regime, they can serve as
guideposts for analyzing the differences between different regimes. If viewed
as the extremes on a spectrum, spanning the degree of direct government
control the regime asserts, these two schools of thought serve to distinguish
the philosophy a government may hold when approaching how to secure
cyberspace.
One extreme is recognized as “Cyber Paternalism,” described elsewhere
as “Data Nationalism,” or “Internet Sovereignty.”45 It is the idea that physical
borders cross over into cyberspace, where ports are erected to manage the
flow of data into and out of a country’s data storage facilities.46 Under this
concept, jurisdiction over data is exercised over the physical media.47 To bet-
ter exercise maximum jurisdiction, all the data collected within the country
will be required to be stored within the country’s physical borders, a process
called data localization.48 On the other hand, this concept has also been used
to claim jurisdiction over a majority of the Internet, regardless of where the
data is stored, by basing jurisdiction upon the concept that citizens bring a
certain domain into your jurisdiction when they access it.49
Meanwhile, the other extreme would prefer treating the Internet like a
“Cyber Commons,” an open space separate from physical borders, where
jurisdiction is defined more by who is managing a certain website’s domain
42. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace, supra note 10, at 1273, 1281–82.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1318 (stating the choice between Internet sovereignty and Internet free-
dom may not be necessary, as cyberspace could be treated as a “pseudocom-
mons” in which public and private regulators cooperate).
45. Id. at 1303.
46. See Anupa Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 680
(2015).
47. See id. at 680.
48. Id. at 680–81.
49. Symposium, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1367, 1394 (1996) (“This would be the modern equivalent of a local lord
in medieval times either trying to prevent the silk trade from passing through
his boundaries . . . or purporting to assert jurisdiction over the entire known
world.”).
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than by where the data may be tangibly stored.50 Security for the domains
would be based on what could be called an industry standard, a level of care
that could be used as a legal standard of care to measure companies against
each other in the event of a breach.51 This standard of care would be the
result of a collaboration between the public and private sectors, businesses,
consulting legislators, and experts on the best approach to enhancing cyber-
security cooperatively.52 This is referred to as a “multi-stakeholder ap-
proach,” as each of these parties are believed to have a stake in Internet
governance.53
III. CHINA’S RESPONSE
A. Before the 2016 Cybersecurity Law
The current treatment of cybersecurity in China is best encapsulated by
a statement from President Xi Jinping in early 2014: “No national security
without cyber security.”54 This quote sets the tone for the protectionist mea-
sures toward “Cyber Paternalism” that are pervasive in China’s cybersecurity
regime, even before the passing of the 2016 Cybersecurity Law.55 The mea-
sures include the strict regulation of software produced by western manufac-
turers and an attempt to foster local innovation in that same area.56 Other
objectives of the Chinese government include: increasing security, domestic
production, domestic demand, and maintaining the ruling party’s political
power.57
50. Id. at 1378–80.
51. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Explor-
ing the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping
Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 305, 311 (2015).
52. Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 346
(2015).
53. Id.
54. Hawke Johannes Gierow, Cyber Security in China: New Political Leadership
Focuses on Boosting National Security, MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINA STUDIES:
CHINA MONITOR 2 (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/
download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_20_eng.pdf.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 2; see also Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 162–63.
57. See Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 162–63; see also Amy Chang, Warring
State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy, CTR. FOR A NEW AMERICAN STRATEGY
12 (Dec. 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_
WarringState_Chang_report_010615.pdf?mtime=20160906082142 (describing
how the Chinese Communist Party uses national security to justify control over
major elements of policymaking).
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But, standing in the way of accomplishing these objectives is a power
struggle between the various ministries in charge of regulating cyberspace.58
Among them are the Ministry for Public Security, the National Bureau for
State Secrets, the Ministry for Industry and Informatiziation, and the General
Staff Division of the People’s Liberation Army.59 These ministries have
chafed against one another due to the ambiguity of their authority over cyber-
space, and the fact that the law grants the departments very broad, discretion-
ary authority.60 Recently, the creation of the “Central Cyber Security and
Informatization Leading Group” (Leading Group) which, while lacking exec-
utive authority, was developed with the intention of creating a buffer be-
tween the various departments.61
At the heart of China’s cybersecurity policy—even today, though it is
now modified by the 2016 Cybersecurity Law—is the Multi-Level Protection
Scheme (MLPS).62 The scheme divides all potential Internet users among
five different levels, with private individuals and small companies at the bot-
tom (levels one and two), and public authorities at the top (level five).63 To
sell IT products to these parties, the product must meet certain criteria appro-
priate for that party’s level.64 For example, a level three IT product (to be
sold to businesses in a strategically important sector, like finance) must:
(1) have been developed by Chinese citizens, legal entities, or compa-
nies with state participation;
(2) have the intellectual property for its key components owned by
China;
(3) have been made by persons with no criminal record at all;
(4) contain no back doors or Trojan horses built in;
(5) pose no risk to national security, public order, or public interests;
and
(6) be certified for requirements of national security.65
This means that companies like Microsoft are completely barred from selling
their products to any party in China that qualifies as level three or above on
the MLPS.66 These protectionist policies can be considered reasonable from
the Chinese perspective because such policies ensure the cybersecurity sys-
tems used in critical sectors are under the government’s strict control.67 There
58. Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 164–65; see Gierow, supra note 54, at 2–3.
59. Gierow, supra note 54, at 4.
60. Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 164–65; Gierow, supra note 54, at 2–3.
61. Gierow, supra note 54, at 3.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id.
64. Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 161–62; Gierow, supra note 54, at 5.
65. Gierow, supra note 54, at 5.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 6.
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are also obvious benefits of such a policy on local manufacturers.68 Such a
protectionist approach is also not unique to China, for example, the United
States has been exercising a similar policy to prevent federal authorities from
acquiring Chinese IT products.69
When foreign companies attempted to interact with the Chinese public
via the Internet, the Chinese government enforced most of its measures
through licensing arrangements with each foreign company.70 A requirement
to assist in censoring content offensive to the government was standard fare
in these licensing arrangements, with companies towing the line under threat
of their operations being banned from the country.71
Entering 20l6, the Chinese cybersecurity scheme was beginning to crys-
talize.72 But even with a figurehead at the top in the form of the Leading
Group, the various ministries worked at cross purposes as each tried to
stretch the outer limits of their authority.73
B. The 2016 Cybersecurity Law
The first chapter of the new legislation states the intended purposes of
the law, and broadly states who is entitled to the rights and obligations the
law creates.74 Some of the notable purposes of the law are advocating the
dissemination of “core socialist values,”75 and putting responsibility for plan-
ning, coordinating, supervising, and managing network security on govern-
ment departments.76 The chapter also puts the responsibility on individuals
and organizations to report conduct endangering network security alongside
an obligation on state departments to respond promptly.77 There is also a
mandate on “relevant network industry organizations” to strengthen their
own security measure, without providing any scheme of how to accomplish
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id.
70. Lotus Ruan, What Does China’s New Cybersecurity Law Mean for Chinese
Internet Companies?, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 10, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/
11/what-does-chinas-new-cybersecurity-law-mean-for-chinese-internet-compa-
nies/ (citing Rebecca MacKinnon, China’s Censorship 2.0: How Companies
Censor Bloggers, FIRST MONDAY (Feb. 2, 2009), http://firstmonday.org/article/
view/2378/2089).
71. Id.
72. See generally Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6.
73. Gierow, supra note 54, at 2–3.
74. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, ch. 1.
75. Id. art. 6.
76. Id. art. 8.
77. Id. art. 14.
416 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XX
the mandate.78 Of special note here is Article 12, which requires all persons
and organizations to take no action that would risk harming China’s socialist
policies.79
Chapter two of the statute gives a general outline of how the govern-
ment will carry out the strengthening of cybersecurity.80 There is a mandate
that all levels of government, from the State Council to autonomous regions
and directly governed municipalities, make comprehensive plans to further
several key sectors.81 The State also claims to encourage several vectors of
enhancing cybersecurity, like encouraging the innovation of new security
technologies, supporting cybersecurity-related education in schools of higher
learning or vocational schools, and otherwise seeking to “cultivate talent” in
cybersecurity.82
In chapter three, the statute specifically outlines the requirements for
network operators, those who manage services available on the Internet.83
Here, the law states both general requirements that network operators must
adhere to,84 along with special duties for operators of “critical information
78. Id. art. 11.
79. Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 12 (“Any person and organization using
networks shall abide by the Constitution and laws, observe public order and
respect social morality; they must not endanger network security, and must not
use the network to engage in activities endangering national security, national
honor and interests, inciting subversion of national sovereignty, the overturn of
the socialist system, inciting separatism, undermining national unity, advocat-
ing terrorism or extremism, inciting ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination,
disseminating violent, obscene or sexual information, creating or disseminating
false information to disrupt the economic or social order, as well as infringing
on the reputation, privacy, intellectual property or other lawful rights and inter-
ests of others, and other such acts.”).
80. See id. ch. 2.
81. Id. art. 16 (“[E]xpand their input; support key network security technology in-
dustries and programs; support network security technology research and de-
velopment, application and popularization; spread safe and trustworthy
network products and services; protect the intellectual property rights for net-
work technologies; and support research and development institutions, schools
of higher learning, and so forth to participate in State network security technol-
ogy innovation programs.”).
82. Id. art. 20.
83. Id. art. 76(3) (defining network operators); see Cybersecurity Law, supra note
6, ch. 3.
84. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 21 (“(1) Formulate internal security
management systems and operating rules, determine persons responsible for
network security, and implement network security protection responsibility; (2)
Adopt technological measures to prevent computer viruses, network attacks,
network intrusions and other actions endangering network security; (3) Adopt
technological measures for monitoring and recording network operational sta-
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infrastructure,” which concerns what has been previously defined as CI.85 Of
special note here is the requirement for all network operators providing ser-
vices like network access and information publication to obtain and store the
real identity of the user.86 CI network operators must also adhere to security
plans that the relevant government departments will implement specifically
on their industry.87 But, what falls under the umbrella of CI as defined by this
law is extraordinarily broad.88 Typical areas are included, like power, water,
and finance, but CI is also considered to be any area where the loss or leak of
data “might seriously endanger national security, national welfare and the
people’s livelihood, or the public interest, on the basis of their tiered protec-
tion system.”89 The government also encourages network operators that do
not manage CI to participate in the duties the law forces upon the CI network
operators.90 This is important because CI network operators must also submit
themselves to review by relevant state departments when they seek to
purchase network products and services that “might” impact their security.91
Those CI operators must also physically store the data gathered or produced
by operations within the country to the mainland territory of China, and must
pass a security assessment from the government if it is truly necessary to
tuses and network security incidents, and follow relevant provisions to store
network logs for at least six months; (4) Adopt measures such as data classifi-
cation, back-up of important data, and encryption; (5) Other obligations pro-
vided by law or administrative regulations.”).
85. Id. art. 34 (“(1) Set up specialized security management bodies and persons
responsible for security management, and conduct security background checks
on those responsible persons and personnel in critical positions; (2) Periodi-
cally conduct network security education, technical training and skills evalua-
tions for employees; (3) Conduct disaster recovery backups of important
systems and databases; (4) Formulate emergency response plans for network
security incidents, and periodically organize drills; (5) Other obligations pro-
vided by law or administrative regulations.”).
86. Id. art. 24 (“Network operators handling network access and domain registra-
tion services for users, handling stationary or mobile phone network access, or
providing users with information publication or instant messaging services,
shall require users to provide real identity information when signing agree-
ments with users or confirming provision of services. Where users do not pro-
vide real identity information, network operators must not provide them with
relevant services. The State implements a network identity credibility strategy,
and supports research and development of secure and convenient electronic
identity confirmation technologies, promoting reciprocal acceptance among
different electronic identity confirmations.”).
87. Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 32.
88. See id. art. 31.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 35.
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provide the data outside the border.92 Altogether, CI network operators must
submit to heavy state supervision and scrutiny that frequently involves re-
vealing sensitive data to the government.93
Chapter four goes into greater detail on the requirements of standard
network operators (not dealing with CI).94 Most of the chapter devotes itself
to entailing what lengths must be reached to ensure the confidentially of what
limited personal information the network operator collects to provide its ser-
vices.95 This is relevant due to the requirement that only real identities may
be provided when an individual solicits network access, domain registration,
or information publication services.96 Another article of note is a mandate
that the network operators manage information published by user, requiring
that the operator prevent the publication of any information that is prohibited
by administrative regulations or other laws.97 This effectively conscripts net-
work operators into furthering the government’s censorship policies and pub-
lic monitoring, as the operator is required to report the attempt to publish the
information to “relevant competent departments.”98 Network operators must
also submit to general state supervision and management.99
Chapter five deals with how the state departments will monitor cyber-
security efforts, alongside what the departments are required to plan for in
terms of if a security risk is identified.100 The last article of the chapter is
noteworthy as it empowers the State Council, along with other levels of gov-
ernment with the State Council’s approval, to take temporary measures to
control network communications in response to emergencies or production
92. Id. art. 37.
93. Id. art. 39 (“State network information departments shall coordinate relevant
departments in employing the following measures for critical information infra-
structure security protection: (1) Conduct spot testing of critical information
infrastructure security risks, put forward improvement measures, and when
necessary may retain a network security service establishment to conduct test-
ing and assessment of network security risks. (2) Periodically organize critical
information infrastructure operators to conduct emergency network security re-
sponse drills, increasing the level, coordination, and capacity of responses to
network security incidents. (3) Promote network security information sharing
among relevant departments, critical information infrastructure operators, and
also relevant research institutions, network security services establishments. (4)
Provide technical support and assistance for network security emergency man-
agement and recovery and so forth.”).
94. See id. ch. 4.
95. Id. arts. 40–45.
96. Id. art. 24.
97. Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 47.
98. Id. art. 47.
99. Id. art. 50.
100. See id. ch. 5.
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safety accidents.101 Among the permitted measures is outright restriction of
access.102
Chapter six discusses liability for network operators who are found to be
violating this statute.103 Of special note is the fact that the government targets
individuals and management directly responsible for the violation with the
appropriate fine, instead of putting the fine on the larger business.104 Another
couple of articles make the furthering of state censorship clear, with the fail-
ure to prevent the dissemination of prohibited information being a fine and a
suspension of operations.105 Article 70 expands the scope of prohibited infor-
mation by including Article 12 (the requirement that no one use the Internet
to disturb “core socialist values”) in the realm of punishable violations.106
The 2016 Cybersecurity Law appears to be both strict and vague. While
duties are specified and penalties detailed, much is left up to the relevant
departments to create.107 This does little to solve the problem of the inter-
ministry struggles that characterized the regime up to this point.108 At the
same time, it is clear that China intends to press gang network operators into
furthering its censorship, even going as far as to have the operators act like
state-sponsored spies.109 While some could consider this little more than a
codification of previously informal practices, the adoption of such a frame-
work cements China as an authoritarian regime maintaining a tight grip on
everything its citizens see and hear.110 This is a clear sign that the country
wants to approach cybersecurity with a paternalistic approach, even if the
law pays lip service to an international effort to secure cyberspace.111
IV. A COMPARISON OF CYBERSECURITY REGIMES
To better provide context for where China sits in the spectrum of gov-
ernment control, this Part concerns itself with an overview of the various
cybersecurity regimes implemented in other countries. These countries have
101. Id. art. 58.
102. Id.
103. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, ch. 6.
104. Id. art. 60.
105. Id. arts. 68–69.
106. Id. art. 70.
107. See id. arts. 8, 19, 23, 39, 49, 50, 51, 53, 69(1) (detailing what various plans
and operations are left to the discretion of “relevant departments”).
108. Gierow, supra note 54, at 2, 4.
109. Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 50; see also id. art. 12.
110. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, The ‘Chilling Effect’ of China’s New Cybersecurity
Regime, FOREIGN POLICY (Jul. 10, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/
china-new-cybersecurity-law-Internet-security/.
111. See Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 121.
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been selected because of their geographic, political, and technological posi-
tion in the world, as all appear to play a role in shaping each countries’
cybersecurity regimes. This comparison should show that while every coun-
tries’ regime has its own unique approach to the same issues, there are gen-
eral trends that can be associated with certain political and geographic
relationships.
A. The Current Regimes
1. United States
While the United States is not the most “wired” country (that honor
goes to South Korea), nor the most “free” country online (recognized to be
Estonia), its position as a superpower and advocate of influential cyber-
security policy makes it impossible to leave out of such a comparative analy-
sis.112 The United States may indulge in some hypocrisy, especially in light
of the NSA scandal,113 but its support for free expression and the free flow of
information online puts at a stark contrast of the blatant censorship and au-
thoritarian top-down cybersecurity regime of China.114
In the United States, the regime is a mix between statutory require-
ments, common law duties (e.g., negligence and corporate fiduciaries) and a
multi-stakeholder framework for private companies to look at as a model of
improve their own networks.115 In its statutory requirements, the United
States uses a sectoral approach, where the laws are drafted for a specific
industry.116 Unfortunately, the execution of these broad statutes has been hin-
dered by a fragmented bureaucracy.117 There also are security regulations
112. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace, supra note 10, at 1310–11.
113. Funk, supra note 28, at 50–51.
114. See id. at 55.
115. Scott J. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up: A Comparison of “Voluntary” Cyber-
security Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217, 223 (2016); see also
Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?, supra
note 51, at 311–25 (discussing the various aspects of the United States’ cyber-
security regime).
116. See Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?,
supra note 51, at 321. Examples of such sectorial legislation include the fol-
lowing: the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for the financial sector; the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Regulation for the chemical sector; the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act for the public health sec-
tor; and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Standards for the
energy sector. See id. at 321–25.
117. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 221 (“Still, a single, compre-
hensive approach to U.S. cybersecurity law and policy has yet to emerge with a
veritable alphabet soup of agencies, including the Department of Homeland
Security, NSA, and the Federal Trade Commission, responsible for various as-
pects of the nation’s cyber defense; the Department of Defense alone report-
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effective in most of the individual states.118 But, since these laws vary from
state to state, this has created a complex and contradictory entanglement of
regulations.119
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) was given
the task of developing a framework that companies could use to map out
their current level of readiness regarding cyberattacks, and what was required
to improve that readiness.120 It is also now being considered in some areas to
be a possible standard of due diligence.121 The Framework’s most interesting
feature is its use as a common language for entities involved in cyber infra-
structure to evaluate their current posture, determine a targeted state, and
assess their progress towards that targeted state.122 It operates through a pro-
cess that utilizes three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Implemen-
tation Tiers, and the Framework Profile.123 The Framework Core provides a
set of activities to achieve specific cybersecurity outcomes, and references
examples of guidance to achieve those outcomes.124 It is a non-exhaustive list
of industry-specific best practices for managing cyber risk and uses a com-
mon terminology that allows for organizations to communicate more effec-
tively.125 These practices are sorted into Informative References, which are
placed at the bottom of a sorting hierarchy, from Function, to Categories, to
Subcategories, and finally to the Informative References.126 The Framework
edly operates more than 15,000 networks in 4,000 installations spread across
88 countries.”).
118. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?, supra
note 51, at 325–26.
119. Id. at 325 (“[F]or example, a handful of states have a ‘no-harm threshold law,’
meaning that it does not matter whether lost information was used in a way that
harmed consumers or not—the mere fact that there has been a breach requires
that notification be given. States also have more-or-less-inclusive lists of per-
sonally identifiable information that must be lost for a breach to warrant disclo-
sure. Meanwhile, in the states that do not have any data breach notification
laws as of 2014—Alabama, South Dakota, and New Mexico—a company
could knowingly have its customers’ social security numbers breached but not
inform those customers and still be legally compliant under state law.”).
120. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 221.
121. Id. at 222.
122. Id. at 223.
123. Id.
124. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, NAT’L INST.
OF STANDARDS & TECH. 4–5 (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.nist.gov/cyber-
framework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf [hereinafter
NIST Framework].
125. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 224.
126. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?, supra
note 51, at 330–31 (“For example, the ‘Identify’ Function contains within it the
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Implementation Tiers are four progressive levels (Partial, Risk Informed, Re-
peatable, and Adaptive) that illustrate how well a firm manages cyber risk
with their Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) practices as compared to the
best practices listed in the Framework Core.127 Taking into account those
practices, the current cyber threat environment, regulatory requirements, bus-
iness objectives, and organization constraints, a firm should be able to iden-
tify which tier it belongs to.128 Further illustrating the Framework’s Core
Functions and Categories are the Framework Profiles, which allow a firm to
recognize gaps in their governance of cybersecurity that need to be addressed
before it can reach its cyber risk management objectives.129 It does so by
using the information gathered from the Core and the Tiers, identifying its
current Profile and its target Profile, and determining what needs to be ad-
dressed to achieve its target Profile from where it differs from the current
Profile.130
The NIST Framework is adaptable, and can expand globally because of
its reference to standards recognized worldwide as best practices.131 Because
of this, it has the potential to serve as a model for international cybersecurity
regulation.132 But, it not a flawless system. Its spread relies entirely on its
appeal to individual businesses, and any sort of recognizable standard that
can serve as a matter of law will take time to develop.133 Even when it does,
scholars argue it may “not go far enough in scope, influence, or impact.”134
‘Asset Management’ Category, which articulates practice outcomes to identify
and manage the ‘data, personnel, devices, systems, and facilities that enable the
organization to achieve business purposes . . . consistent with their relative
importance to business objectives and the organization’s risk strategy.’”).
127. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 225.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing NIST Framework, supra note 124, at 4).
131. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?, supra
note 51, at 336–37.
132. Id.
133. See Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 225–26.
134. Scott J. Shackelford, Protecting Intellectual Property and Privacy in The Digi-
tal Age: The Use of National Cybersecurity Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Risk,
19 CHAP. L. REV. 445, 460 (2016) (citing Tony Romm, Cybersecurity Still in
Slow Lane, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2014, 10:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/
2014/02/cybersecurity-in-slow-lane-one-year-after-obama-order-103307.html?
hp=f1).
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2. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK) is moving towards a NIST Framework, but
has not adopted the structure fully.135 Generally, the UK has focused on de-
veloping voluntary standards to enhance CI security.136 In 2014, it took an-
other step in this direction with the “Cyber Essentials” program, created to
“incentivize widespread adoption of basic security controls that will help to
protect organizations against the commonest kind of attack.”137 A certifica-
tion program, Cyber Essentials was made mandatory for all UK government
contractors handling personal or sensitive information, but is voluntary to all
others.138 Cyber Essentials’ requirements include self-certification for basic
security systems, like firewalls, secured configuration, user access control,
and patch management.139 The Cyber Essentials Assurance Framework is go-
ing to supplement existing organizational approaches to risk management.140
Specifically, the certification requirements call on businesses to follow the
British government’s “Ten Steps to Cyber Security.”141
In 2015, the Advice Sheets were added to the ten-step cybersecurity
program.142 They set out the actions and measures that represent a good foun-
dation for effective information risk management, much like the NIST
Framework, but without the extensive categorization.143 While the structure
is not copied, many of the objectives listed in the NIST Framework’s Catego-
ries and Subcategories have been adopted by the Advice Sheets.144 Since the
release of the 2015 Advice Sheets coincided with a joint announcement be-
tween the chief executives of the United States and the UK proclaiming an
135. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 229–30.
136. Id. at 228.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, CYBER ESSENTIALS
SCHEME REQUIREMENTS (June 2014), http://www.cyberstreetwise.com/cyberes-
sentials/files/requirements.pdf.).
140. Id. (citing U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, CYBER ESSENTIALS
SCHEME ASSURANCE FRAMEWORK (2015), http://www.cyberstreetwise.com/cy
beressentials/files/assurance-framework.pdf.).
141. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 229 (citing U.K. DEP’T FOR
BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE FOR BUSINESS
(2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-risk-management-
a-board-level-responsibility).
142. Id. at 229–30.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 230.
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intent to work with industry to align cybersecurity best practices and stan-
dards, it appears to be a manifestation of that proclamation.145
3. European Union
Noteworthy at the outset of this section is the odd relationship the Euro-
pean Union (EU) has in both being a source of uniform regulations, and a
collection of sovereign states that have the authority to implement state-spe-
cific solutions.146 As a result, the organization has the more difficult task of
achieving harmony among best practices in cybersecurity.147 Regardless, the
EU as a whole has recognized the importance of balancing security with free
flow of data.148 But, in contrast to the United States, the EU’s approach to
regulating cyberspace is comprehensive, with one cybersecurity law covering
most industries and providing greater uniformity.149 The current EU cyber-
security strategy has five priorities:
(1) achieving cyber resilience;
(2) reducing cybercrime;
(3) creating a new cyber defense policy;
(4) developing industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity;
and
(5) establishing an international cyberspace policy for the European
Union that promotes core EU values.150
To accomplish the first priority, there is emphasis on cooperation between
the public and private sectors, along with propositions for minimal security
requirements that would apply to all Member States.151 For the second prior-
ity, the strategy is focused on combatting the use of botnets, networks of
computers infected by a program which coordinates them to attack servers by
overloading them with requests.152 The cyber defense policy is the result of
145. Id. at 230–31 (citing FACT SHEET: U.S.-United Kingdom Cybersecurity Co-
operation, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/01/16/fact-sheet-us-united-kingdom-cybersecurity-coop
eration).
146. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 237.
147. Id.
148. See Chander & Le, supra note 46, at 688 (citing Council Directive 95/46, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31, 36–37).
149. Kenneth K. Dort et al., CYBERSPACE LAW: RECENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2015).
150. Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 156 (citing Joint Communication to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European
Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, at 4–5 JOIN (2013) 1 final
(Feb. 7, 2013)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 157.
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collaboration between civilian and military approaches in protecting critical
cyber assets.153 Finally, the EU seeks to “promote openness and freedom on
the Internet, close the digital divide, and build consensus in international
cybersecurity policymaking.”154
The EU has undergone some localization policies, mainly codified by
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).155 The GDPR allows com-
panies to transfer data outside the EU if appropriate safeguards are in place,
such as binding corporate rules, a valid “European Data Protection Seal” for
both controller and recipient, standard data protection clauses, or contractual
clauses with prior authorization from the member state’s data protection au-
thority.156 Originally, there was a safe harbor provision for the United States,
allowing for the transfer of data without certification so long as certain pro-
tection standards were met. This provision has since transformed into the
2016 US-EU Privacy Shield.157
4. Russia
The Russian government has adopted many of the measures taken by
China to ensure its cybersecurity.158 Some of this is the result of sanctions
from the West, preventing Russia from using Western technology to carry
out its localization policies.159 The government has sought to localize data by
prohibiting the storage of Russians’ personal data outside the country.160 The
locations of the storage facilities must also be disclosed to the government.161
Any entity that organizes the dissemination of information on the Internet is
required to store all information about the arrival, transmission, delivery, and
processing of voice data, written text, images, sounds, or other kinds of ac-
tion for six months in Russia.162 Legislation was passed near the end of 2016
that effectively gives the government control over much of the physical ar-
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Chander & Le, supra note 46, at 690.
156. Id.
157. See generally European Commission Press Release IP/16/216, EU Commission
and United States Agree on a New Framework for Transatlantic Data Flows:
EU-US Privacy Shield (Feb. 2, 2016) (detailing the new arrangement for the
migration of data between the European Union and United States).
158. Andrei Soldatov & Trina Borogan, Putin Brings China’s Great Firewall to




160. Chander & Le, supra note 46, at 701.
161. Id. at 702.
162. See Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 229–30.
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chitecture of the Internet in the country, from exchange points to domain
names and cross-border fiber-optic cables.163
5. Israel
Frequently attacked by both private and state actors, Israel has devel-
oped what is widely recognized as one of the most sophisticated cyber-
security systems in the world.164 The cybersecurity regime is focused on the
efforts of the Israel National Cyber Bureau (INCB), whose purpose is three-
fold: to defend national infrastructures from cyberattack; advance Israel as a
world-leading center of information technology; and encourage cooperation
between academia, industry, and the private sector, as well as between gov-
ernment agencies and the security community.165 The INCB categorizes
projects to accomplish its mandate into three areas: the development of
cybersecurity infrastructure, the organization of personnel concerning that ef-
fort, and the maintenance of a cybersecurity network.166 Two of the accom-
plished projects thus far are coordinating between government ministries to
foster both academic and entrepreneurial research and the development of
cybersecurity products.167 The third and latest project was a more direct ap-
proach towards academic research, partnering with two Israeli universities to
research not only technology, but also relationships between technology, so-
cial science, and legal fields.168 At the same time, the organization also con-
solidated the administrative aspects of cyber regulation and made
recommendations to the government through a multi-stakeholder process.169
Overall, the Israeli approach seems to be an almost even split between direct
government control and allowing other stakeholders to lead the charge, as it
is a government agency that both directs and promotes cybersecurity. This is
163. Id.
164. Daniel Benoliel, Towards A Cybersecurity Policy Model: Israel National
Cyber Bureau Case Study, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 435, 442 (2015).




166. Id. at 443–44.
167. Id. at 448–49.
168. Id. at 449.
169. Id. at 451; see also id. at 451 n.78 (“The process included four stages. Initially,
INCB collected and processed expert testimonies. Soon after, a public advisory
committee was established. Then a series of open consultations as well as par-
ticular consultations took place. Lastly, INCB generated a list of recommenda-
tions, which were at first open for public commentary, and then the INCB
passed the final regulation recommendations to the Israeli government for
consideration.”).
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especially shown in the INCB’s strategy in establishing a regulatory
framework.170
6. India
India has been slow to adopt a cybersecurity regime, and what it has
now could be recognized as one still in infancy.171 The Indian IT Act of 2000
appears to serve as the foundation for the current cybersecurity regime.172
Amended in 2006 to require protection of what the law identified as “Critical
Information Infrastructure,” it made companies liable if they did not follow
“reasonable security practices and procedures.”173 Amended again in 2008,
the law made companies liable if they were negligent in implementing and
maintaining reasonable security practices, with said practices defined by ei-
ther a specific agreement between the parties, by law, or “by the Central
Government in consultation with such professional bodies or associations as
it may deem fit.”174 This resulted in the Indian government having broad
authority to dictate what measures were required to ensure CI protection.175
In trying to secure its citizen’s data, India has implemented a localization
policy, preventing transfers of data abroad unless it is for the “necessary” end
of a contract.176 The country also has demonstrated the desire to locally de-
velop technologies that can help protect CI and enable economic develop-
ment, as shown by the 2013 National Cyber Security Policy.177
170. Benoliel, supra note 164, at 451 (“The first strategic proposition solicits recom-
mendations ‘to the Prime Minister and government regarding national cyber
policy.’ The second and third propositions are more general and thematic: to
‘promote research and development in cyberspace and supercomputing,’ and to
devise a ‘national concept’ for coping with ‘emergency situations in
cyberspace.’”).
171. Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 165.




176. Chander & Le, supra note 46, at 695 (quoting Information Technology (Rea-
sonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or In-
formation) Rules, 2011, Gazette of India, subsec. II(3)(i) (Apr. 11, 2011)). (“A
body corporate or any person on its behalf may transfer sensitive personal data
or information including any information, to any other body corporate or a
person in India, or located in any other country, that ensures the same level of
data protection that is adhered to by the body corporate as provided for under
these Rules. The transfer may be allowed only if it is necessary for the perform-
ance of the lawful contract between the body corporate or any person on its
behalf and provider of information or where such person has consented to data
transfer.”) (emphasis added).
177. Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 168.
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While it initially appears that India is emulating the “Internet Sover-
eignty” policies of Russia and China, the 2013 policy also gave individual
businesses the capacity to structure their own security program, emulating
the “bottom-up” approach used in Europe and the United States.178 India has
also made strides to try and promote internationally recognized best practices
by promulgating guidelines through its National Critical Information Infra-
structure Protection Centre.179
7. Japan
Japan faces a similar threat in cyberspace as the United States and the
EU, and similarly favors self-governance for the private sector over top-
down legislation.180 The 2015 strategy for the country emphasizes that “Au-
tonomy” and “Collaboration among Multistakeholders” are core principles
that inform the entire strategy.181 The government combined that philosophy
with a scheme much like the NIST Framework, providing a guiding frame-
work that “enables stakeholders . . . to promptly evaluate enterprises’ efforts
to address cybersecurity.”182 If a firm makes an effort to follow the frame-
work to evaluate and enhance their cybersecurity, financial incentives are
provided.183 The end result is a mix of self-governance for the private sector
and regulatory oversight, portraying the role of government as a policy em-
phasizer that encourages the private sector to motivate itself and take their
own initiatives.184 The current strategy also specifies “security by design,”
making cybersecurity considerations central to the development process of
new products.185 Since any relevant products are the result of the input of
multiple stakeholders, the strategy promotes a dialogue in these areas.186 It
does so by first assessing the benefits and risks of potential policies and then
setting forth security obligations for the various stakeholders.187 So the Japa-
nese approach appears to prefer private action over state rule, but seeks to
foster such initiative by taking the first steps alongside the private sector.188
178. Id.
179. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?, supra
note 51, at 350.
180. Id. at 242.





185. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 244.
186. Id. at 245.
187. Id.
188. See id.
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8. South Korea
Unlike Japan and the United States, South Korea has used a heavier
hand when dictating cybersecurity policy.189 Frequently the target of attacks
from North Korea, South Korea has instituted both broad-spectrum protec-
tions of personal data along with sectoral regulations governing other areas
of cybersecurity.190 Specifically, there is the Personal Information Protection
Act, which regulates the collection and use of personal information—most
importantly, resident registration numbers, which are similar to Social Secur-
ity Numbers in the United States—and requires a minimum of cybersecurity
precautions.191 Breach notifications are also part of the regime, keeping the
government aware of any leaks in the system.192
South Korea also practices localization policies from both modern and
decades-old statutes. While data is allowed to be exported, the manager of
the information of the “data subject” (the original collector of a person’s
data), must provide extensive information about the overseas transfer to the
data subject.193 Another, more obscure source of localization is the 1961
Land Survey Act (replaced in 2009 by the Act on Land Survey), which is
primarily used to prevent mapping data of the country from being stored on
servers outside the country.194
9. Summary
There are geographic and political factors guiding the decision on how
to handle cybersecurity in these countries. The more authoritative regimes,
Russia and China, aim towards a nationalistic approach, with their respective
governments solidly helming all action and supervising as much of the net-
work as they can.195 Such a policy helps them stifle political dissent within
their regulated networks.196 Meanwhile, Europe and the United States take a
more cooperative stance with the private sector, not precisely treating the net
as a “commons,” but working collaboratively to create something that could
be recognized as a standard of care for cybersecurity.197 At the same time,
smaller countries tend to gravitate towards whatever larger power (e.g., Rus-
189. Id. at 246.
190. Id.
191. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 246.
192. Id. at 245.
193. Chander & Le, supra note 46, at 703–04.
194. Id. at 704.
195. See Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 331.
196. Id.
197. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?, supra
note 51, at 309–311, 346.
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sia, China, United States), exerts greater influence upon them.198 For exam-
ple, while South Korea tries to emulate western policies, it proximity to
China and the threat its faces from an aggressive North Korea force it to take
more of a middle path between protecting its “borders” in cyberspace and
joining the commons.199
B. The Potential Harms of China’s Cybersecurity Regime
China’s cybersecurity law could inflict far-reaching harm. The country’s
economic ties and massive domestic market of over a billion consumers
makes it a difficult entity to negotiate with. Few companies will be able to
avoid adhering to this law and remain competitive in the global market. The
potential harms of China’s cybersecurity regime thus include both (1) a nega-
tive effect on the Chinese people and (2) foreign companies seeking profit in
China.
1. Harm to the Chinese Public
The most obvious harm is the expansion of the authoritarian state,
which seeks to deprive its citizens of information that it deems would harm
its own power. This is a hallmark of an authoritarian regime, to silence dis-
sent within and prevent access to subversive information without. Thus, the
public’s ability to express itself is sorely diminished, while at the same time
society as a whole receives little to no benefit.
Regarding the typical, benign motives that the government has set forth,
such as trying to protect the privacy of the public and safeguarding infra-
structure from attack or surveillance, such a policy appears to contravene
those ends rather than achieve them.200 First, the law actively works against
any preservation of privacy alone, forcing citizens to present their real iden-
tity to network operators. This allows for the government to indirectly moni-
tor, without due process, citizen’s online activities. This is a blatant scheme
that puts the party in place of the government, allowing it to quickly stifle
dissent. The localization requirement will also most likely make Chinese data
even easier to attack, as not only will the technology in China fall behind
(discussed in more detail below), but the fact that all the data is bound within
the borders of the country means that the public loses out on the global distri-
bution of data across servers.201 This saves foreign surveillance operations in
logistical costs, as they can concentrate their efforts on specific locations.202
Private actors also see these policies as inherently weak, since other countries
198. See Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115 at 242–43, 247–48; see also
Eichensehr, supra note 52, at 335.
199. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 115, at 247–48.
200. Chander & Le, supra note 46, at 715.
201. Id. at 716–717 (known as the “Protected Local Provider” problem).
202. Id. (this is called the “Jackpot” problem).
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that have implemented localization policies, like Vietnam and Indonesia,
have become massive targets for hackers.203
Even when taking into consideration China’s stated economic goals for
such a regime, the public will most likely be unable to reap the benefits.
China’s intentions for its cybersecurity policy is to improve security and fos-
ter a domestic market for demand and innovation.204 But, it is unlikely this
regime will achieve those ends. First, with regards to fostering domestic in-
novation, depriving the Chinese market of competition from abroad actively
works against that goal. Much like protectionist policies regarding trade, a
decline in competition stagnates development, as domestic producers no
longer need to keep up with foreign producers to sustain themselves. As tech-
nology enhancing cybersecurity advances, the Chinese will most likely be
left with inferior products from domestic producers, and as a result could be
even more vulnerable to attacks.205 It is arguable that the domestic product is
either already inferior or is simply nonexistent, as China has been a net im-
porter of technology.206 In fact, most of the technology the Chinese govern-
ment uses to censor the public’s access to the Internet comes from American
IT companies.207 Second, China’s hope to grow the domestic economy by
requiring storage of data to be within the borders of the country will also fail
to provide any cognizable benefit for the public, because such a policy has
been seen to only benefit a small group of people and enterprises.208 Only the
companies that manage or service very expensive data centers will see any
benefit, and these companies do not require many employees because data
centers are more power-intensive than workforce-intensive.209 Meanwhile,
the localization policy will be widely felt by businesses of any size that are
denied access to global services they might use improve productivity.210 At
the same time, domestic start-ups will be denied access to cheaper data cen-
ters abroad, most likely stalling any effort to start the business in the first
place.211 This effect can hurt even businesses not specifically tied to the In-
203. Id. at 720–721.
204. See Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 162–63.
205. See Chander & Le, supra note 46, at 715–18.
206. Richard Winfield & Kristin Mendoza, Does China Hope to Remap The Internet
in Its Own Image?, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 85, 93 (2008).
207. Id.
208. See Chander & Le, supra note 46, at 722–23.
209. Id. at 724.
210. Id. at 722–23. (“For example, besides the loss of international social media
platforms, localization would make it impossible for Russians to order airline
tickets or consumer goods through online services. Localization requirements
also seriously affect Russian companies like Aeroflot because the airline de-
pends on foreign ticket-booking systems.”).
211. Id. at 725.
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ternet, as it has been seen that most of the economic benefits of Internet
technologies end up in traditional businesses like agriculture and
healthcare.212
Another factor of this law that will hinder economic growth is the
amount of discretionary authority it gives the various (and overlapping) state
ministries.213 In allowing each ministry to sculpt its own regulatory land-
scape, each individual area of business will have to deal with disparate, and
perhaps even conflicting, legislation.214 Meanwhile, the turf battles between
the ministries could also freeze up the regulatory process.215 Ultimately, this
law will most likely fail to provide the Chinese with the benefits that the
government has stated as their objectives. At the same time, the public will
most likely be harmed, not only by the cost of implementing this law and the
possible loss of access to larger portions of the Internet, but also by the eco-
nomic losses that will result when foreign businesses are forced to react to
the burdens of the new legislation. Such burdens are discussed below.
2. Harm to Foreign Businesses
Many foreign companies and economic conglomerates petitioned the
Chinese government to not enact this law as it was being drafted.216 This was
for good reason, as this law has an onerous effect on any company that wants
access to the Chinese market. Combining that with the fact that the Chinese
market counts for roughly a seventh of the global population means that al-
most any company with international reach will either suffer additional costs
and strict government oversight or lose out on accessing the single biggest
212. Id. at 727 (citing James Manyika et al., Disruptive Technologies: Advances that
Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global Economy, MCKINSEY GLOBAL
INST. 55 (2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/dis-
ruptive_technologies). (“The potential economic impact across the major sec-
tors—healthcare, manufacturing, electricity, urban infra-structure, security,
agriculture, retail, etc.—is estimated at $2.7 to $6.2 trillion per year.”).
213. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 8; see also Digital Divide, supra note
37, at 164–65.
214. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 8, 32; see also Digital Divide, supra
note 37, at 164–65.
215. See Digital Divide, supra note 37, at 165; see also Allen-Ebrahimian, supra
note 110.
216. China Adopts Tough Cyber-Security Law, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2016), http://
www.economist.com/news/china/21710001-foreign-firms-are-worried-china-
adopts-tough-cyber-security-law; Katie Conger, China’s New Cybersecurity
Law is Bad News for Business, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 6, 2016), https://techcrunch
.com/2016/11/06/chinas-new-cybersecurity-law-is-bad-news-for-business/;
Sue-Lin Wong & Michael Martina, China Adopts Cyber Security Law in Face
of Overseas Opposition, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2016 4:49 AM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/us-china-parliament-cyber-idUSKBN132049; Allen-Ebrahimian,
supra note 110; Ruan, supra note 70.
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market on the planet.217 After this law becomes effective, companies wishing
to enter the Chinese market will not only have to weigh the cost of handling
user data within the country and opening up their business to government
oversight, but will also need to settle the ethical question of whether the
company can be complicit in helping the government monitor the activities
of its citizens.218 Of course, motivated by the typical desire to maximize
profit, most companies would comply, succumbing to what is a thinly dis-
guised case of economic blackmail.219
A good illustration of the trouble foreign business needs to endure to
access the Chinese market is Google’s attempt to establish a Chinese domain
(google.cn). Google, known for its informal maxim “don’t be evil,”220 origi-
nally had difficulty accessing the Chinese market from operations based in
California (a dot-com domain with Chinese translation), both because of the
government filtering search results and outright outages.221 Upon establishing
a dot-cn domain, Google began to self-censor in accordance with Chinese
regulations.222 Google was aware that such a move ran counter to its policies,
but decided that the good it could provide outweighed the harm of following
the government’s censorship scheme.223 A few years later, after experiencing
a massive cyberattack that appeared to be from a Chinese attempt to access
the accounts of Chinese human rights activists, Google ceased its self-censor-
ship and shifted its operations in China to Hong Kong (changing domains
from “.cn” to “.hk”).224 This led to a return to the status quo before Google.cn
was established, with the site facing frequent filtering in China.225 But, a
surprising result of the conflict was a renewal of Google’s license to operate
217. See Jyh-An Lee et al., Searching for Internet Freedom in China: A Case Study
on Google’s China Experience, 31 CARDOZO ARTS ENT. L.J. 405, 412–13
(2013).
218. See id. at 426–427.
219. See id. at 426.
220. Id. at 410.
221. Id. at 413.
222. Id. at 413–414. This appears to be the essence of the trap the Chinese govern-
ment has created. It censors content from abroad (causing the service to slow
down and become unreliable) to compel companies to develop local operations,
at which point the company falls under the country’s territorial laws and must
self-censor. See Lee et al., supra note 217, at 425.
223. Id. at 414. (“The company admitted that its self-censorship ‘runs counter to
Google’s most basic values and commitments.’ According to Google’s Chief
Legal Officer, David Drummond, Google ‘launched Google.cn . . . in the belief
that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a
more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some
results.’”).
224. Id. at 417–18.
225. Id. at 418.
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as an Internet Content Provider, believed by some to be an attempt by the
government to distance itself from the perception that the business market in
the country was highly politicized.226 Unfortunately, while some touted
Google’s move as a successful protest of the Chinese censorship policies, the
ultimate result was the Chinese public being deprived of access to a wealth of
information.227
Google had to deal with censorship regulations before the drafting of the
law that concerns this comment. Under the new law, Google will most likely
have to store user data (with the true identity of the user) and that data could
easily be collected by the government.228 Also, should a user have posted
content the government found offensive on the company’s social media ap-
plication, Google+, or its Gmail service, the company would have to not only
take the content down but may have been obligated to report it.229 Such a
scheme may not be entirely offensive if the content in question threatened
violence, but under the Chinese government’s policies as reflected in the
2016 Cybersecurity Law, this content could simply be something that offends
the country’s socialist policies.230 Microsoft and Yahoo! proved this by their
own actions, by shutting down those who create content that speaks out
against the Chinese government and even going so far as to assist in their
detention.231
Facing such a hostile and oppressive environment can lead to economic
decline if companies decide they cannot, or will not, shoulder the burden.
The chilling effect will likely send aftershocks through the global economy.
Such a global impact is discussed in more detail below.
3. Harm to Globalization
Whether globalization itself is a positive force that should not be
stymied is beyond the scope of this comment. This comment is only con-
cerned with the impact the law will have on the globalization trend. Here the
226. Id. (citing Rebecca MacKinnon, On Google’s License Renewal and Principled
Engagement, RCONVERSATION (July 9, 2010), http://rconversation.blogs.com/
rconversation/2010/07/on-googles-license-renewal-and-principled-engagement
.html).
227. Id. at 423–24 (citing SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERY-
THING (AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) 118–19 (2011)).
228. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, arts. 8, 9, 37, 50.
229. See id. arts. 47, 48, 68, 70.
230. See Allen-Ebrahimian, supra note 110.
231. Lee et al., supra note 217, at 415–16. It should be noted that Yahoo! later
moved its storage facilities out of China to prevent incidents like these from
recurring, however, should its services later be found to constitute critical infra-
structure, the company would either have to return to storing the data in China
or cease operating in the country altogether. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note
6, art. 37.
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problem is two potential outcomes that are not mutually exclusive: (1) China
so burdens access to its people online that it puts a noticeable drag on the
growth of cloud-based businesses, slowing down economies that put an em-
phasis on that industry; and (2) China uses its connections within the global
community to spread its cyber-protectionist policies, compounding the issues
already discussed above.
As the Internet has grown, the possibilities of cyberspace have increased
exponentially alongside it. But, as these possibilities are exploited, they be-
come more dependent on interconnectivity being maintained. With its special
position in the global economy, China can make big waves should it choose
to complicate matters. Unfortunately, this is what the 2016 Cybersecurity
Law appears to be leaning towards, as it seems to—despite having articles to
the contrary232––try and isolate China from the rest of the Internet.233 As
previously discussed, the barrier China is trying to erect makes international
commerce harder, as larger companies have to adjust their networks to ac-
commodate the Cybersecurity Law, or miss out on reaching a massive mar-
ket; both have economic costs that will naturally be passed onto the
consumer.234
This drag on the global community would be multiplied should other
countries began to adopt the burdens China puts on those attempting to ac-
cess its citizens. As Peter Wu was quoted in Who Controls the Internet?, “the
question is no longer how the Internet will affect China. It is how China will
affect the Internet.”235 Already, Russia appears to be following down the road
China has laid, and countries like South Korea and India appear to be torn
between the United States and China, appearing to posture like the giants on
the playground.236 In fact, it appears that this could be a goal for China, to
attempt to take the lead in dictating global Internet governance.237 Should a
scheme much like the one advanced by the 2016 Cybersecurity Law spread,
the burdens it would place on international network operators would escalate
costs to a degree that few companies would be able to participate. In the most
extreme eventuality, it could grind globalization to a halt.
232. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, art. 7.
233. See id. art. 37.
234. See Laura DeNardis, Five Destabilizing Trends in Internet Governance, 12 I/S:
J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 113, 128–29 (2015).
235. Winfield & Mendoza, supra note 206, at 86 (quoting JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM
WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 104 (2006)).
236. See Brown & Yung, supra note 1; see also Chander & Le, supra note 46, at
703–04; see also Chang, supra note 57, at 15; see also Digital Divide, supra
note 37, at 168–69.
237. See Winfield & Mendoza, supra note 206, at 92–93 (discussing how China is
increasing global suppression by increasing demand for censorship technolo-
gies and lobbying for greater international control of Internet resources).
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V. CONCLUSION
While the government’s reasoning behind the passing of this law is not
surprising, and falls in line with Chinese cybersecurity policies that have
come before it, this could still place a heavy, or even fatal, burden on busi-
nesses trying to cater to the Chinese market. Not only are network operators
under threat of their area being considered CI at any point in time, but the
results of such a finding would essentially conscript the operator into serving
as government censors.238 What this law makes plainly clear is that protec-
tionist cybersecurity policies have much in common with protective tariffs.
While both seek to support local production and enhance security, they actu-
ally stifle innovation by weakening competition, and the local population is
left in even worse position than before. Ironically, this will most likely harm
the Chinese themselves, as their government now peers more deeply into
their daily lives and allows for stagnation to grip the market for technology
related to cybersecurity.
238. See Cybersecurity Law, supra note 6, arts. 12, 50, 68–69.
